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Abstract
According to the so-called Lockean thesis, a rational agent believes
a proposition just in case its probability is sufficiently high, i.e., greater
than some suitably fixed threshold. The Preface paradox is usually
taken to show that the Lockean thesis is untenable, if one also assumes
that rational agents should believe the conjunction of their own beliefs:
high probability and rational belief are in a sense incompatible. In this
paper, we show that this is not the case in general. More precisely,
we consider two methods of computing how probable must each of a
series of propositions be in order to rationally believe their conjunction
under the Lockean thesis. The price one has to pay for the proposed
solutions to the paradox is what we call “quasi-dogmatism”: the view
that a rational agent should believe only those propositions which are
“nearly certain” in a suitably defined sense.
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1 Introduction
The notion of rational belief is central to philosophy and formal epistemol-
ogy, and provides the conceptual foundation for theories of reasoning and
rational decision-making in a number of fields, from economics to artificial
intelligence. In the philosophical discussion, virtually all commentators agree
on the idea that belief is fallible: even an ideally rational agent may believe
some statement without being fully and definitely certain of its truth. Most
theorists also agree that probability provides the best formal tool to model
fallible belief: the “degrees of belief” of a rational agent in the propositions
he accepts should be construed as degrees of probability.
Interestingly, the attempt to develop a model of fallible, rational belief
along these lines has proved rather challenging. Well-known results—like the
so-called Preface and Lottery paradoxes—seem to undermine the intuitive
idea that a rational agent should believe exactly those propositions that he
accepts with a sufficiently high degree of belief, an intuition known in the
literature as the Lockean thesis. One central problem is the following: there
are situations where the Lockean thesis forces an agent into rationally believ-
ing each one of n propositions a1, . . . , an, but prevents him from rationally
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believing their conjunction a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an. In reaction to such results, partici-
pants to the debate have explored various ways to re-think the link between
probability and rational belief, sometimes departing in radical ways from
the Lockean thesis (e.g., Jeffrey (1970); see Cevolani and Schurz (2017) for
discussion).
In this paper, we address this issue in a somehow conservative manner.
More precisely, we retain two crucial ideas: first, that degrees of belief are
governed by the rules of the probability calculus; second, that the connection
between plain belief and degrees of belief is governed by the Lockean thesis.
We then explore how far the use of probability can be pushed in order to
gain useful insights on the notion of rational belief. In particular, we present
two results: the former is based on standard probability functions taking
values in the usual real unit interval, while the latter makes use of infinitesi-
mal probabilities defined on a non-Archimedean extension of the real field.1
Each result provides a way to preserve both the notion of rational belief (as
consistent and logically closed belief), the probabilistic nature of degrees of
belief, and the Lockean thesis connecting them.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we recap some classical
results from the logico-philosophical discussion on rational belief and proba-
bility, which serve as the background for our discussion. In section 3, we show
how it is possible to believe long conjunctions of beliefs under the Lockean
thesis even in the face of the Preface paradox. Finally, in section 4 we discuss
some implications of our approach, and compare it with other proposals in
the literature. The Appendix contains the proofs and a concise introduction
to non-standard probability for the reader interested in the more technical
details.
2 Fallibilism, rational belief, and probability
The idea that human knowledge, including science, is fallible—uncertain and
incomplete at best—is shared by most philosophers and scientists alike. “We
never can be absolutely sure of anything”—wrote Charles Sanders Peirce,
the founding father of modern fallibilism—and we “cannot attain absolute
certainty concerning questions of fact” (Hartshorne et al., 1931–1958). Mod-
1One of the distinguishing features of real numbers is the property of being
Archimedean: given two real numbers a, b such that 0 < a < b then there must exist
a natural number n such that n · a > b. Equivalently, one can say that Archimedean
fields do not possess infinitesimals (see Definition A.1). In the Appendix, we introduce
and define the Archimedean property of the real field and show how to construct non-
Archimedean fields, i.e., extensions of the real fields lacking that property.
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eling this notion of knowledge as rational belief in the face of uncertainty and
fallibilism, however, has proven challenging.
In this section, we shortly review the discussion of two different formal
models of belief: one qualitative account of “plain” or “full” belief, and one
quantitative account of probabilistic “degrees of belief” (the reader already
acquainted with this debate in formal epistemology may safely skip it). In the
next section, we present two ways of connecting these two models into one
unified account of rational fallible belief while eschewing some well-known
problems with this connection.
2.1 Plain belief
A simple and natural way of representing the beliefs of a rational agent is to
model them as a set B of propositions in some language. The agent believes
each proposition a belonging to B, and does not believe those propositions
which are not in B. Rationality is here construed in terms of two conditions
on such a “belief set”: B has to be consistent and logically closed. The
former condition states that a rational agent should not accept contradictory
beliefs; the latter, that he should believe all propositions entailed by what
he already believes. In particular, this latter condition implies that if the
agent believes both a1 and a2 then he should also believe their conjunction
a1∧a2. More generally, logical closure entails the principle commonly known
as “conjunctive closure” (Schurz, 2019, p. 4):
Conjunctive Closure For any belief set B, if a1 ∈ B, . . . , an ∈ B then
a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an ∈ B.
This rather simple account seems to lack the capability of delivering a proper
notion of (rational) fallible belief. The central problem is that, for any propo-
sition a, only three “epistemic attitudes” are possible for a rational agent:
either to accept a (if a ∈ B), or to reject it (if ¬a ∈ B), or to suspend the
judgment on a (if neither a nor ¬a are elements of B). Thus, no room is left
for the idea that the agent may “fallibly” accept a, i.e., believe a even if he
is not completely certain that a is indeed true. This, we submit, is the main
lesson taught by the famous “paradox of the preface” introduced by David
Makinson in a short, seminal paper in 1965 (Makinson, 1965, p. 205):
Suppose that in the course of his book a writer makes a great
many assertions, which we shall call a1, a2, . . . , an. Given each
one of these, he believes that it is true. If he has already written
other books, and received corrections from readers and reviewers,
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he may also believe that not everything he has written in his latest
book is true. [. . . ]
However, to say that not everything I assert in this book is
true, is to say that at least one statement in this book is false.
That is to say that at least one of a1, a2, . . . , an is false, where
a1, a2, . . . , an are the statements in the book; that a1∧a2∧· · ·∧an
is false; that ¬(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ · · · ∧ an) is true. The author who writes
and believes each of a1, a2, . . . , an, and yet in a preface asserts
and believes ¬(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ · · · ∧ an) is, it appears, behaving very
rationally. Yet clearly he is holding logically incompatible beliefs:
he believes each of a1, a2, . . . , an,¬(a1∧a2∧· · ·∧an), which form an
inconsistent set. The man is being rational though inconsistent.
In stating in the preface that the book will contain some error, Makinson’s
writer is acknowledging his own fallibility. He is saying that, even if he is
willing to rationally accept each claim in the book, he cannot fully believe
their conjunction. Conjunctive closure, however, makes this kind of doxastic
attitude impossible: since the author fully believes each claim, he must also
believe their conjunction, and contradict himself in the preface.
What seems needed here is then another, more sophisticated account of
rational fallible belief. An account which makes room for fallibilism by ad-
mitting not only full but also “partial” belief in a proposition or, in other
words, degrees of belief. Such degrees of belief or “credences” may be for-
mally represented as a function β which assigns to each proposition a a degree
of belief β(a) between (say) 0 and 1. The agent could then believe differ-
ent propositions to different degrees, the maximum (1) being reserved to
the propositions he fully believes (as tautologies and mathematical truths).
This account would straightforwardly capture the idea of fallibilism in the
following sense (Schurz, 2019):
Weak Fallibilism For some a ∈ B, β(a) < 1; i.e., a rational agent has non-
maximum degrees of belief in at least some of propositions he believes.
This corresponds to a quite minimal conception of fallibilism, which is shared
by virtually all commentators. This is for a good reason, since rejecting Weak
Fallibilism would require one to embrace the following position:
Dogmatism For all a ∈ B, β(a) = 1; i.e., a rational agent can only believe
propositions of which he is fully certain.
Since Dogmatism is rejected by most of the participants in the debate, in-
troducing degrees of belief appears as a natural move in order to obtain a
defensible account of rational fallible belief. As we shall see in a moment,
however, this alternative account has problems on its own.
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2.2 Degrees of belief
The idea of degrees of belief can be formalized in many different ways. Here,
we will follow a common approach in formal epistemology, which assumes a
standard probabilistic reading of degrees of belief coupled with a subjective
(i.e., “personalist”, “Bayesian”) interpretation of probability. More precisely,
we shall work within Kolmogorov’s theory of finitely additive probability
functions2 and follow de Finetti approach to interpret subjective probability
as based on so called Dutch book arguments3. Let us recall here the main
features of such an approach.
In a series of seminal contributions, de Finetti provided a foundation of
subjective probability theory in terms of rational or “coherent” degrees of
belief, quantifying the uncertainty subjectively assigned to a set of proposi-
tions as considered by a rational agent (cf. de Finetti (1931) and de Finetti
(1974)). More precisely, de Finetti starts from an ideal betting game be-
tween two players, a bookmaker and a gambler. The gambler wagers money
on the occurrence of a number of events, or, equivalently, on the truth of the
corresponding statements about the world, let’s call them a1, . . . , an.
4 Each
event ai, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, can either occur (w(ai) = 1) or not (w(ai) = 0) in
a possible world w. Bookmaker’s beliefs are represented by an assignment
β : {a1, . . . , an} → [0, 1], specifying the degree of belief β(ai) in each event.
To be coherent, the beliefs of an agent must then obey the following criterion:
De Finetti’s coherence criterion A belief assignment β : {a1, . . . , an} →
[0, 1] is coherent if, for each choice of real numbers σ1, . . . , σn, there
2To recall, a finitely additive probability function is a [0, 1]-valued map P defined on
algebras of events that assigns total certainty (i.e., degree 1) to the sure event Ω and such
that P (a∨ b) = P (a) +P (b) for all those events a and b whose logical conjunction a∧ b is
empty Kolmogorov (1933).
3As noted by the reviewers, this is not the only possible way of approaching the analysis
of rational degrees of belief. First, there is a plethora of theories of uncertainty quantifica-
tion, alternative to classical probability, spanning from Dempster-Shafer belief functions
to possibility and necessity measures, imprecise probabilities and many others; see Halpern
(2003) for a broad overview. Second, one could assume an objectivist interpretation of
probabilities in terms of frequencies, which also satisfies, and hence justifies, the axioms
of probability. Moreover, other approaches exists even in the subjectivist camp, including
those of De Morgan (1847), Ramsey (1926), and Bayes himself (Hailperin, 1996).
4Since events can be easily regarded as assertions about the truth of the corresponding
statements, we will henceforth speak equivalently of events, assertions, or propositions,
without danger of confusion. We also invite the interested reader to consult Flaminio
et al. (2014) for a logical development of de Finetti’s conception of events.
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exists a possible world w such that:
n∑
i=1
σi(β(ai)− w(ai)) ≥ 0. (1)
In the above statement, the real numbers σi’s represent gambler’s stakes
and the formula (1) expresses bookmaker’s balance.5 Thus, an assignment is
coherent (and hence bookmaker’s odds are fair prices) if it prevents the book-
maker from what is known as a sure-loss, that is, a gambler’s choice of stakes
σ1, . . . , σn forcing bookmaker’s balance to be strictly negative independently
of the occurrence of each event.
The connection between probability theory and coherent belief assign-
ments is established by a famous theorem due to de Finetti, stating that an
assignment β : {a1, . . . , an} → [0, 1] is coherent if and only if it extends to
a finitely additive probability measure over the Boolean algebra generated
by a1, . . . , an. In other words, a belief assignment is coherent if and only if
those beliefs are consistent with Kolmogorov’s axioms of (finitely additive)
probability theory (Kolmogorov, 1933).
De Finetti’s theorem provides a subjective justification of the probabilis-
tic account of rational fallible belief. In a nutshell, the belief of a rational
agent (i.e., de Finetti’s bookmaker) can be modeled as a subjective prob-
ability distribution under the coherence of β; hence, β(a) represents the
agent’s credence in a, i.e., the probability the agent assigns to a. In this
connection, we will henceforth work only with “Carnap-regular” probability
functions, that is to say, probability functions which assign degrees 1 and 0
only to tautologies and contradictions, respectively. This assumption comes
with no particular costs from de Finetti’s coherence criterion viewpoint. In-
deed, in several contributions (Shimony, 1955; Kemeny, 1955; Flaminio et al.,
2018) it is shown that a refinement of the latter, that nowadays goes under
the name of strict-coherence criterion, captures Carnap-regular probabilities
in the same way as de Finetti’s coherence captures probability functions.
More precisely, Flaminio et al. (2018, Corollary 6.5) show that an assign-
ment β : {a1, . . . , an} → [0, 1] is strictly-coherent if and only if it extends to a
Carnap-regular probability function on the algebra generated by {a1, . . . , an}.
The account of rational partial belief just presented obviously satisfies
Weak Fallibilism, since an agent will assign non-extreme credences to all
propositions a different from tautologies and contradictions. Interestingly, it
5Note that stakes can be negative as, following tradition, money transfers are oriented
so that “positive” means “gambler-to-bookmaker”. Thus, from the gambler’s perspective
“paying” a negative σi means “receiving” −σi from the bookmaker and vice-versa.
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also offers a quick way out of Makinson’s paradox of the preface, by rephras-
ing it in probabilistic terms (Easwaran, 2016, sec. 1.2). In this new scenario,
the book’s author does not fully believe any of the assertions a1, a2, . . . , an
that appear in the book’s preface, nor their conjunction6. However, he has
a (high) degree of belief β(ai) in each of those claims, even if lower than 1.
What about their conjunction? The monotonicity of probability measures
immediately prescribes that the probability of a conjunction of events is lower
than (or equal to) the probability of each of the conjuncts:
β(a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) ≤ β(ai),
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This means that the author cannot believe in the
conjunction of the statements in the book more firmly than any of those
statements. Indeed, the probability of such a conjunction may be significantly
lower than that of each of the conjuncts. In this case, the author will believe
with correspondingly high probability that the conjunction is false, which is
another way to state the prefatory remark according to which the book will
contain some mistake. In other words, no paradox needs to arise, if we refrain
from talking about belief or acceptance at all, and only take into account the
degrees of belief, or credences, expressed by the relevant probabilities.
This “dissolution” of the Preface Paradox is not costless, however. In fact,
being purely probabilistic, this approach seems unable to account for the very
notion of “plain” or “full” rational belief we started with. This is clearly
seen by observing that, assuming Carnap-regularity, no proposition, with
the exception of plain tautologies and contradictions, is ever fully accepted
or rejected by the agent. We can only talk about more or less extreme
credences, leaving the notion of full belief apart: a conclusion that is, to say
the least, less than satisfactory.7
3 How to believe long conjunctions of beliefs
The upshot of the discussion in the previous two sections is the following.
We have two different accounts of rational belief, one based on consistency
and logical closure and one based on probabilistic coherence. Within the
former, it is easy to model plain belief, but not to accommodate the idea
6We may think that the author does not include tautologies in the book.
7In a long-running exchange, Isaac Levi (1980) and Richard Jeffrey (1970) famously
defended, respectively, Dogmatism (under the label of “infallibilism”) and “radical prob-
abilism”, i.e., “to avoid talk about knowledge and acceptance of hypotheses, trying to
make do with graded belief”; with few exceptions, all other commentators found these
two positions just too extreme (cf. Cevolani and Schurz, 2017).
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that some beliefs can be less-than-certain (i.e., the idea of Weak Fallibilism).
The latter account makes full justice of this idea in terms of probabilistic
degrees of belief, but completely abandons any talk of plain belief. Is it
possible to combine the two approaches just outlined, in order to obtain an
account of full belief which still respects Weak Fallibilism and leaves room
for probabilistic credences? An attempt to get the best of both worlds is
assuming the following condition (Foley, 2009):
Lockean Thesis For all a, a ∈ B iff β(a) ≥ r, with 0.5 < r < 1.
In words, a rational agent fully believes all propositions which are sufficiently
probable, i.e., have probability greater than some “Lockean” threshold r,
possibly depending on the specific context (Leitgeb, 2014; Schurz, 2019).
Note that, in any case, r needs to be greater than 0.5 (otherwise the agent
may accept both a proposition and its negation, thus violating consistency)
and smaller than 1 (in order to satisfy Weak Fallibilism). Also note that the
Lockean thesis can be split into two conditions: one sufficient (if β(a) ≥ r
then a ∈ B) and one necessary (if a ∈ B then β(a) ≥ r).
The Lockean thesis is attractive because it provides a way to model plain
belief within a probabilistic framework. Unfortunately, the Preface paradox
can be turned into an argument against the thesis. To see how, let’s assume
that rational belief is governed by the Lockean thesis: an agent assigns a
degree of belief to each relevant proposition, and only accepts those which
are sufficiently “believable” (i.e., probable). In the original Preface scenario,
the author is prepared to believe each of the claims a1, a2, . . . , an in the book
and hence, by Conjunctive Closure, also their conjunction. This means (by
the necessary condition in the Lockean thesis) that β(ai) ≥ r for each of these
claims and also that β(a1∧ . . .∧an) ≥ r. However, for any Lockean threshold
r, it is possible to find a coherent assignment and a sufficiently large number
n of claims for which β(a1 ∧ . . .∧ an) falls below r.8 In turn, this means that
either the author believes the conjunction a1∧ . . .∧an even if it is improbable
(against the Lockean thesis) or he doesn’t believe it even if he believes each
of its conjuncts (against the principle of Conjunctive Closure). In sum, it
seems that the qualitative and the probabilistic account cannot be combined
together after all.9
8One special case, however, is worth noting. If the statements a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an are such
that one of them entails all the others, the probability of their conjunction will be equal
to that of this “root” belief. Thus, the conjunction will be belivable under the Lockean
thesis if the root belief is. This case, however, is sufficiently unrealistic to be safely put
aside here (more on this in the next subsection).
9The well-known Lottery paradox (Kyburg, 1961), which we don’t discuss here, shows
that also the sufficient condition of the Lockean thesis is incompatible with Conjunctive
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A common reaction to the collapse of the Lockean thesis has been aban-
doning Conjunctive Closure as a rationality requirement on fallible belief
(Christensen, 2004; Kyburg, 1961): since believing long conjunctions of be-
liefs (assertions) with high probability seems impossible, a rational agent
cannot be always asked to accept the conjunction of what he believes. The
debate, however, is still ongoing (Lin and Kelly, 2012; Leitgeb, 2014; Fitel-
son and Easwaran, 2015; Cevolani, 2017; Schurz, 2019) and we shall discuss
some of these contributions in the next section. In the following, we explore
a different question: is believing long conjunctions under the Lockean the-
sis really impossible? Or: under what conditions can the Lockean thesis be
maintained, without falling into the Preface paradox?
3.1 Archimedean degrees of belief
Let us rephrase as follows our central question above: is it possible that a
long conjunction of n propositions is believable under the Lockean thesis?
And: under what conditions does this happen? To answer these questions,
we proceed as follows.
Given n propositions a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an, we want to find a threshold value on
their probabilities β(a1), . . . , β(an) such that their conjunction is acceptable,
i.e. such that
β(a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) ≥ r
for any given Lockean threshold r. To this purpose, we need to know what
β(a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) amounts to in general. Note first that, in the special case
where all n relevant events are probabilistically independent from each other,
then β(a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) simply amounts to the product of their probabilities:
β(a1) · . . . · β(an) (more on this special case in section 4).
As for the general case, we can rely on a classical result in probability
theory usually attributed to Maurice René Fréchet and Wassily Hoeffding,
which allows us to calculate a lower and upper bound for the probability of
an arbitrary conjunction of events:
Theorem 3.1 (Fréchet-Hoeffding Bounds). Let β be a coherent belief as-
signment on the set of assertions {a1, . . . , an}. Then:
β(a1) · · ·  β(an) ≤ β(a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an) ≤ min{β(a1), . . . , β(an)}. (2)
The  operator appearing in the first inequality above is the so-called
 Lukasiewicz t-norm, defined as follows: for any two numbers x, y ∈ [0, 1],
Closure. Together, the Lottery and Preface paradoxes “create a pincer movement on the
Lockean thesis” (Foley, 2009) with no cheap solution (Schurz, 2019).
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xy := max{x+y−1, 0}. In words, Theorem 3.1 states that the probability of
a conjunction stands in between the probability of the less probable conjunct
(upper bound) and the product of the probabilities of all the conjuncts,
modulo the  Lukasiewicz t-norm (lower bound). Note that this lower bound
is zero if the sum of all relevant probabilities does not exceed 1.
This well-known result leads to an interesting, if unnoticed, implication
for the analysis of rational belief. In fact, it immediately allows one to
find a lower bound s for the probabilities of the propositions a1, . . . , an which
guarantees the acceptability of their conjunction under any possible (positive)
Lockean threshold r:
Proposition 3.2. Let a1, . . . , an be n assertions and let 0 < r ≤ 1 be a real
number. If β(ai) ≥ s = n+r−1n for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then β(a1∧· · ·∧an) ≥
r.
Proof. The result follows by direct computation. We want to have β(a1∧. . .∧
an) ≥ r. We know from Theorem 3.1 that β(a1∧. . .∧an) ≥ β(a1)· · ·β(an).
Let consider the less probable among the n propositions and call it aj: thus,
β(aj) = min{β(a1), . . . , β(an)}. Clearly, we obtain the lower possible value
for β(a1)· · ·β(an) assuming that all relevant propositions have probability
β(aj). One can check that β(a1)  · · ·  β(an) ≥ β(aj)  . . .  β(aj) =
max{nβ(aj) − (n − 1), 0} by definition of the  Lukasiewicz t-norm. We can
now calculate the minimum value s such that, if β(aj) ≥ s then β(a1 ∧ . . . ∧
an) ≥ r. Indeed one can check that, assuming β(aj) ≥ s = n+r−1n , then
n · β(aj) − (n − 1) ≥ n · n+r−1n − (n − 1) = r > 0 and thus, by applying
Theorem 3.1,
β(a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) ≥ β(a1) . . . β(an) ≥ β(aj) · · ·  β(aj) ≥ r,
as desired.
The above result provides a sufficient condition for believing arbitrarily
long conjunctions of beliefs (assertions) a1∧. . .∧an under the Lockean thesis,
when their number n is finite and fixed. More precisely, it provides a thresh-
old s = n+r−1
n
such that if the degree of belief in each ai is at least s, then
their conjunction is believable, i.e., its probability is at least r. In connection
with the Preface paradox, Proposition 3.2 tells us how firmly authors should
believe each of the assertions contained in their book, in order to also believe
their conjunction. Note that s ≥ r and that s depends both on the Lockean
threshold r and on the number n of the conjuncts (more on this in the next
section, cf. Table 1).
Proposition 3.2 highlights a subtle aspect of the argument against the
Lockean thesis based on the Preface paradox which, to our knowledge, has
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not been discussed so far. It is the following. Consider n beliefs a1, . . . , an
which are contingent, not pairwise contradictory, and not such that one of
them logically entails all of the others. Then, it is always possible to find both
a probability assignment β according to which β(a1∧ . . .∧an) falls below the
Lockean threshold r, even though each β(ai) ≥ r (this is the lesson taught
by the Preface paradox), but also a (different) probability assignment such
that β(a1∧ . . .∧an) stays above r. In other words, the high-probability view
of rational belief embodied in the Lockean thesis and the requirement of
Conjunctive Closure are not strictly incompatible in general: if one has high
enough degrees of belief in the single conjuncts, one can rationally believe also
their conjunction, and Proposition 3.2 provides a sufficiency condition for this
to happen. We shall discuss the implications of this result in subsection 3.3;
in the next subsection, we explore another way out of the Preface paradox
based on non-Archimedean probabilistic degrees.
3.2 Non-Archimedean degrees of belief
The main result in the previous section, namely the bound established in
Proposition 3.2, depends on the number n of assertions for which one aims to
believe the conjunction a1∧· · ·∧an. This means that the number n of relevant
assertions must be fixed in advance, in order to calculate the corresponding
bound. In this section, we relax that assumption and we hence tackle the
following question: under the usual hypothesis of (strict) coherence, how
much should an agent believe each of a finite, but arbitrary large, set of
propositions in order to also believe their conjunction? As we shall see in
a moment, we can provide a precise, general answer to this question by
considering “infinitesimal” degrees of probability. Formally, this amount to
allowing probability functions to take values in the unit interval ∗[0, 1] of a
non-Archimedean extension of the real field (Benci and Nasso (2003); the
construction of infinitesimals is illustrated in details in Appendix A). We
will refer to the elements of the set ∗[0, 1] as hyperreals. In particular, we
will prove that believing all the relevant propositions with a coherent belief
infinitesimally close to 1 is sufficient in order to also believe their conjunction.
Intuitively, it seems reasonable enough to assume that the author of a
carefully prepared book may believe each of the claims in the book with a
rate of confidence which is very close to certainty. Formally, this amounts to
assign to the author’s degrees of belief in each of claims of the book the value
1 − ε, where ε ∈ ∗[0, 1] is an infinitesimal greater than zero. Interestingly,
de Finetti’s coherence criterion is sufficiently robust to be consistent with
such infinitesimal degrees of belief. In particular, one can prove (Montagna
et al., 2013, Theorem 4.1) that, keeping fixed the definition of coherence
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as given above (see p. 7), a ∗[0, 1]-valued belief assignment β over a set
of events {a1, . . . , an} is coherent if and only if there exists a ∗[0, 1]-valued
finitely additive and normalized map P on the Boolean algebra generated by
{a1, . . . , an} which extends β.
Taken this for granted, we can state the following result (the proof is
given in Appendix A).
Proposition 3.3. Let {a1, a2 . . . } be a countable (possibly infinite) set of
assertions and let β be a coherent belief assignment such that β(ai) > 1− ε,
for each i and for a positive infinitesimal ε. Then, for every finite subset
{aj1 , . . . , ajn} of {a1, a2 . . . }, β(aj1 ∧ . . . ∧ ajn) > 1− nε.
In informal terms, if our author is “nearly certain” of the truth of each
of the propositions in the book — having in each of them a degree of belief
infinitesimally close to 1 — then the author will also believe their conjunc-
tion with sufficiently high probability under any Lockean threshold r. More
precisely, the author will be nearly certain both of the single assertions made
in the book and of their conjunction, assigning, respectively, to each ai a
probability greater than 1−ε and, to their conjunction, a probability greater
than 1−nε, which is lower than the former but still infinitesimally close to 1
(and greater than any real-valued threshold r). This result provides another
way out of the Preface paradox, if infinitesimal degrees of belief are allowed.
Interestingly, the introduction of non-Archimedean degrees of belief allows
also for further extensions of the basic framework discussed so far, in at least
two ways. First, one can think of relaxing the assumption that the relevant
Lockean threshold r must be a real number; instead, it seems now natural
that r can be any hyperreal threshold. The following result takes care of this
more general case:
Proposition 3.4. Let ε be a positive infinitesimal and let 0 < r < 1 be any
hyperreal number. Then there exists a hyperreal s > 0 such that, for every
n ∈ N, and for every set of assertions a1, . . . , an, if β is a coherent belief
assignment such that β(ai) > s for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then β(a1∧· · ·∧an) > r.
The proof of the proposition above is given in the Appendix. Here, it is
interesting to point out that, if we fix a hyperreal threshold r < 1 extremely
close to 1, say r = 1− δ for an infinitesimal δ, then the claim above can be
proved taking s = 1− δ2 and hence moving from one order of infinitesimals
to a higher one. It is also interesting to remark that, if the threshold r < 1
is indeed a real number, then Proposition 3.4 can be slightly strengthen by
saying that for every infinitesimal ε, for every natural number n and for every
set of assertions a1, . . . , an, if β(ai) > 1− ε, then β(a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an) > r. Notice
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that in this particular case, the choice of ε is independent from r, while in
the statement of Proposition 3.4 it indeed depends on the hyperreal number
r.
A second, possible extension concerns the case of a rational agent believ-
ing the conjunction of infinitely, yet countably, many propositions a1, a2, a3, . . ..
Of course, this case requires to stretch a bit the standard Preface scenario
and to think of a book possibly infinite in length; however, it is interesting
to note that our approach can deal also with this rather extreme case. To
this purpose, let us rephrase as follow our central question:
(Q) Let 1/2 < r < 1 be any real-valued Lockean threshold and let a1, a2, a3, . . .
countably many assertions. Are there real numbers β(a1), β(a2), β(a3), . . .
strictly contained between r and 1 and such that β(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3 ∧ . . .)
still remains greater than r?
Although one may reasonably argue that the conjunction of infinitely many
assertions is not an assertion itself, we can still construe β(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3 ∧ . . .)
as an hyperreal number and identify it with the sequence:
β∞ = 〈β(a1), β(a1 ∧ a2), β(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3), . . .〉.
Then, answering (Q) amounts to require that β∞ ≥ r, which indeed holds
when β(a1∧ . . .∧ai) ≥ r for (almost) all i ∈ N. Interestingly, it is possible to
define probabilistic degrees of belief that satisfy the above condition. Con-
sider the map β recursively defined on a1, a2, a3 . . . as follows: β(a1) =
r+1
2
and for all i > 1, β(ai) =
β(ai−1)+1
2
. That is to say:
β(a1) =
r + 1
2
, β(a2) =
r+1
2
+ 1
2
, β(a3) =
r+1
2
+1
2
+ 1
2
, . . .
Solving the previous fractions we hence obtain:
β(a1) =
r + 1
2
, β(a2) =
r + 3
4
, β(a3) =
r + 7
8
, . . . , β(ai) =
r + 2i − 1
2i
, . . .
Now we can prove that the above defined β satisfies our requirements. First,
it is easy to see that for all i ∈ N, r < β(ai) < 1. Furthermore, for all
i ∈ N, β(a1 ∧ . . .∧ ai) ≥ β(a1) . . . β(ai) > r. One also can prove (see the
Appendix for a proof) that
β(a1) . . . β(ai) =
(2i − 1)r + 1
2i
. (3)
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Thus, since r < 1, one obtains that, for all i ∈ N
β(a1) . . . β(ai) =
(2i − 1)r + 1
2i
>
(2i − 1)r + r
2i
=
2ir − r + r
2i
= r.
This gives a positive answer to our question (Q): under any Lockean threshold
r, a rational agent can believe the conjunction of infinitely, yet countably,
many believable propositions.
Along with that of subsection 3.1, the above results provide another way
out of the Preface paradox, if infinitesimal degrees of belief are allowed. Of
course, one may well be skeptical about applying infinitesimal probabilities
to modeling the belief of real agents, and the philosophical relevance of this
move can well be criticized (see, e.g., Williamson (2007); Easwaran (2014)).
In this connection, we just note that proposals for a non-Archimedean treat-
ment of interesting issues in epistemology and philosophy of science have
been successfully advanced in the literature: two relevant examples being the
discussion of the Lottery paradox by Wenmackers (2013) and that of inter-
theory reduction and approximate explanation by Pearce and Rantala (1985),
who both apply non-standard analytic methods. Moreover, the philosophi-
cal debate on such methods is open, with, e.g., Benci et al. (2016) defending
infinitesimal probabilities are useful models of uncertainty quantification.10
In the next subsection, we discuss the implications of our results for the
analysis of rational belief, before surveying some interesting connections with
other recent proposals in the literature in Section 4.
3.3 Rational belief, quasi-dogmatism, and contextual-
ism
Let us summarize the results obtained so far. In section 3.1, we considered a
rational agent assigning standard (Archimedean) probabilistic degrees of be-
lief to each of n propositions (with n finite and fixed in advanced). We then
proved (Proposition 3.2) under which conditions the agent can rationally be-
lieve the conjunction a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an of such propositions under the Lockean
thesis, given that he believes each of them: this happens if the probability as-
signed to each ai is sufficiently high, i.e., greater than a threshold s depending
both on the Lockean threshold r and on the number n of propositions.
10More generally, one could note that philosophical worries also challenge the applica-
tion of real-valued or rational-valued probability measures as adequate constructions of
credences, since no real agent can presumably discriminate between, say, a 0.7899 and
0.7990 degree of belief. This however does not prevent the possibility of usefully exploring
probabilistic models of rational belief, as we do in this paper.
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In section 3.2, we considered instead a rational agent assigning non-
standard (non-Archimedean) probabilistic degrees of belief to the relevant
propositions. In this case, our result (Propositions 3.3 and 3.4) reads as
follows: independently from the number of propositions and from the given
Lockean threshold, if the agent is nearly certain of each proposition (assigns
to it a degree of belief infinitesimally close to 1) then he will also believe the
conjunction with near certainty.
The main message of our paper is thus that conjunctive closure and prob-
abilistic degrees of belief are compatible after all, even in the face of the
Preface paradox. More precisely, we showed that, under the Lockean thesis,
it is possible to believe a long conjunction of propositions with sufficiently
high probability, provided that the probability assigned to each proposition
is even higher11.
Let us now briefly discuss some interesting implications of our two results.
The first is that both offer a precise way to compute the minimum degree
of belief one should assign to each of a number of propositions in order to
be rationally justified to also believe their conjunction under the Lockean
thesis. We suggest that this is a kind of problem which may arise, if only
implicitly, in many circumstances. For instance, a judge may demand that
each single piece of evidence collected by the prosecutor meets a very high
threshold s of credibility before admitting it to the trial; such a threshold
may be exactly that which guarantees that the whole body of evidence is
credible enough (more probable than r) to withstand the debate to follow.
Or, a jury or judge may require such a high standard to convict a suspect
“beyond reasonable doubt”. Or, a given scientific community may implicitly
set threshold s as the standard one scholar must conform to when presenting
a bunch of claims which have to be jointly accepted. And so on. In all such
circumstances, our results provide a precise way of quantifying the “burden
of proof” put, so to speak, on a would-be believer: in order to jointly believe
these n assertions to such-and-such degree, you need first to accept each of
them to such other, higher degree of belief.
A second relevant aspect of our analysis is that, in order to rationally be-
lieve long conjunctions of propositions, an agent has to be “quasi-dogmatic”
in the following sense (compare the discussion in section 2.1):
Quasi-Dogmatism For all a ∈ B, β(a) ≈ 1; i.e., a rational agent can only
believe propositions of which he is nearly certain.
11It may be worth adding that the degree of belief assigned to a conjunction is obviously
never greater than that assigned to each of its conjuncts, even in the non-Archimedean
case, where both probabilities are infinitesimally close to 1 (cf. Proposition 3.3).
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s
n r = 0.51 r = 0.8 r = 0.95
2 0.75500 0.90000 0.97500
3 0.83667 0.93333 0.98333
5 0.90200 0.96000 0.99000
10 0.95100 0.98000 0.99500
100 0.99510 0.99800 0.99950
1000 0.99951 0.99980 0.99995
Table 1: Values for the threshold s required to believe the conjunction of n
propositions, depending on three different values of the Lockean threshold r.
This is particularly clear in the non-Archimedean case, where agents assign
degrees of belief infinitesimally close to 1 (greater than 1− ε) to each propo-
sition in their belief set. But also in the standard, Archimedean case, the
probability threshold s required to believe a conjunction of believable propo-
sitions quickly approaches 1 as soon as the number n of propositions grows
larger or the Lockean threshold r increases. Table 1 shows how, even for
low values of r, s quickly increases already for relatively low values of n.
This leads to another way of phrasing our main result: in order to escape
the Preface paradox, and preserve together conjunctive closure and prob-
abilistic degrees of belief, quasi-dogmatism is the price to pay. Note that
Quasi-Dogmatism entails Weak Fallibilism (but not vice versa, of course)
while avoiding the consequences of full Dogmatism; how defensible it is as a
general epistemological position is an issue we are not going to discuss here.
A third implication of our analysis, which has to do with the issue of “con-
textualism” (Schurz, 2019), is also worth noting. Many accounts of rational
belief are contextual in the sense that at least some of their tenets depend
on specific aspects of what we may call the doxastic situation of the agent.
For instance, as already noted above, the fixation of a precise value for the
Lockean threshold r if often left to the context (provided that 0.5 < r < 1):
some situations may require very high bounds for rational belief, others may
be more permissive. This is an instance of a quite weak form of contextu-
alism. Other, stronger forms make rational belief depend more heavily on
specific features of the context, for instance on the way the relevant propo-
sitions are identified, as in the accounts of Isaac Levi (1980) or of Hannes
Leitgeb (2014) (see Schurz (2019) for discussion). In this connection, one of
our results (i.e., Proposition 3.2) is also contextual, but in a quite weak form.
Indeed, once the Lockean threshold r has been fixed, the probability required
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to rationally believe a (long) conjunction only depends on the number n of
its conjuncts (cf. Table 1). However, it does not depend on the logical form
of the propositions involved, on their (logical or probabilistic) relationships,
or on any other feature of the doxastic context.
This has, in turn, two interesting implications for a rational author in
the Preface paradox scenario. First, the “longer” the book, i.e., the higher
the number n of propositions that the author wants to jointly believe, the
higher the threshold s that the probability of each of them has to pass.
A second, subtler implication is the following. Suppose that the author
believes with probability greater than s each of the n propositions in the
book, and hence accepts their conjunction with probability greater than r (as
for Proposition 3.2). Moreover, let an+1 be a “new” proposition not already
contained in the book and with probability also greater than s. Still, if the
book is expanded by adding an+1 to it, the author might not be confident
enough to believe all the assertions anymore, i.e., the probability of the new
conjunction a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an ∧ an+1 may fall below r. This is because, given that
s depends on n, some of the “old” propositions in the book (or possibly also
an+1 itself) may fail to pass the new threshold s
′ = (n+1)+r−1
n+1
.
Finally, as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, our approach in this
paper invites for a more general reflection on possible ways out of the Preface
paradox and of similar challenges to the analysis of rational belief. Indeed, in
our analysis three different parameters play a crucial role: first, the number
n of assertions contained in the book (or, more generally, in a belief set);
second, the Lockean threshold r relevant for believing each single claim;
and, third, the threshold s relevant for believing the conjunction of such
claims (the one that we computed in Proposition 3.2). Now, for each of
these parameters, one can ask what bounds guarantee that rational belief is
closed under conjunction. More precisely, one can ask: (1) How high can
the Lockean threshold r be without risking failure of the conjunctive closure
condition? (2) How low can be the value of s be without risking failure of the
same condition? (3) How high can the number n of claims be without risking
the same? Different choices of the most relevant parameter(s) and different
answers to the above questions lead to different accounts of the paradox.
(In most cases, one parameter will result as a function of one or two of the
others.)
As for this paper, we can note that Proposition 3.2 addresses question (2)
above, while Proposition 3.3 answers both questions (1) and (2) within the
non-Archimedean domain. Other contributions in the literature address dif-
ferent sets of questions, and might be classified according to the answers
they provide (an interesting task that we have to leave for the future). In
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the next section, we focus on three of them, highlighting their relations with
our proposal.
4 Discussion and comparison with other pro-
posals
Before concluding, the connections of our results with other contributions
in the literature are worth pointing out. Three of them are particularly
important. The first is a recent paper by Schurz (2019), who proves a number
of “impossibility results for rational belief”, including a generalized version
of the Preface paradox, which are directly relevant to our own results; in
particular, Schurz’s discussion directly addresses question (3) as presented at
the end of the foregoing section. The second is the work by Makinson (2012),
who connects the work on the logic of uncertain inference in the tradition
of Adams’ probability logic with the discussion of the Lottery and Preface
paradoxes in formal epistemology and anticipates some of the basic ideas of
our paper; his approach follows the lead of question (1) above. The third is a
paper by Douven and Uffink (2003) on the Preface paradox which shows some
interesting similarities and differences with our approach; indeed, they also
essentially address question (2), but using a formulation involving conditional
probabilities. In this section, we discuss each of these contributions in turn.
4.1 Comparison with Schurz’s impossibility results
In a recent paper, Schurz (2019) provides a thorough analysis of the logical
and conceptual connections among a number of rationality requirements for
the notion of (qualitative and quantitative) rational belief, including different
versions of the Lockean thesis and the requirement of conjunctive closure as
discussed in the present paper. His results, presented in the form of two
impossibility results, lead him to conclude that the conflict among these
requirements “is too deep to allow for cheap solutions: it requires a drastic
departure from beloved rationality standards” (Schurz, 2019).
As already mentioned, the analysis provided here, as based on the idea of
quasi-dogmatism, aims at showing that conjunctive closure and probabilistic
degrees of belief are compatible after all, even in the face of the Preface
paradox. At a first look, it may appear that our results violate Schurz’s
impossibility theorems. This is not, however, the case: to anticipate, Schurz
proves that, if the Lockean threshold is sufficiently high, then one can escape
his limiting results, and this is exactly what we do in the present paper.
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In any case, a comparison with Schurz’s approach is both interesting and
instructive.
Let us first briefly survey some results from Schurz’s paper. His first
impossibility result is a generalization of the Preface paradox and concerns
the following requirement:
Rich Fallibilism For all ai ∈ B = {a1, . . . , an}, β(ai|a1 ∧ · · · ∧ ai−1) ≤ τ ,
where r ≤ τ < 1 and r is a Lockean threshold; in words, the mutual
conditional probability of a rational agent’s beliefs is upper-bounded
by a threshold τ smaller than 1 and greater or equal to r.
Schurz proves that the Lockean thesis, conjunctive closure and rich falli-
bilism can not stand together (“are inconsistent”, in his terminology) when
the agent’s belief set is sufficiently large, i.e. for n > | log r|/| log τ | (cf. his
Theorem 1).
This impossibility result has interesting relations to our Proposition 3.2.
Indeed, in a sense the two results are two faces of the same coin, since they
look at the same problem from two different angles. Schurz addresses the
question of how large (or small) the set of propositions believed by the agent
needs to be in order to keep together the Lockean thesis, conjunctive closure
and rich fallibilism (his result indeed relates n with r and τ). Instead, we
ask (see Proposition 3.2) how high the probability of each belief ai must be,
in order to guarantee conjunctive closure under the Lockean thesis. As we
shall see in a moment, these two perspectives are indeed fully compatible.
First, let us recall that, since β is strictly coherent (see Section 2.2), one
can express the probability of a conjunction of propositions as the product
of the conditional probability of each propositions given the others:
β(a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an) =
n∏
i=1
β(ai|a1 ∧ · · · ∧ ai−1). (4)
If one now requires (according to Rich Fallibilism) that β(ai|a1 ∧ · · · ∧
ai−1) ≤ τ , it follows that:
r ≤ β(a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an) =
n∏
i=1
β(ai|a1 ∧ · · · ∧ ai−1) ≤ τn,
where the left-hand inequality follows from Proposition 3.2, while the right-
hand holds given Rich Fallibilism. Now, one can check (by simple calculation,
as reported also in the proof of Theorem 1.1 in (Schurz, 2019, sec. 3)) that
r ≤ τn is equivalent to n ≤ | log r|/| log τ |, which is precisely the condition
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under which the impossibility result is not triggered. In other words, our
result does not fall under Schurz’s impossibility result: the threshold that we
calculate is sufficiently high to guarantee that his theorem does not apply.
This also tells us that there are at least two ways to keep together conjunctive
closure and the Lockean thesis in the face of the Preface paradox: either
limiting the number of believed propositions (Schurz’s result) or fixing a
sufficiently high threshold for the probability of each proposition.
A similar remark can be made for the other main impossibility result
from Schurz (2019), i.e., his Theorem 2. Roughly (we refer the reader di-
rectly to (Schurz, 2019, sec. 4) for relevant definitions and discussion), this
says that the Lockean thesis is inconsistent with an apparently innocuous
property called there “open-mindedness”: i.e., that the number m of dox-
astic possibilities (possible worlds) compatible with the beliefs of a rational
agent may be quite big. However, Schurz also proves (see his Corollary 3
to Theorem 4) that, if the Lockean threshold r is set sufficiently close to 1,
one can escape the mentioned impossibility result: this is basically the idea
behind quasi-dogmatism, and hence confirms that our analysis also does not
violate Schurz’s second impossibility result.
This leads to another interesting issue, that we can only mention in pass-
ing. After proving the above-mentioned results, Schurz (2019, Proposition
4) also notes that the incompatibilty between the Lockean thesis and open-
mindedness reappers if one allows that the number m of doxastic possibilities
can grow arbitrarily large, a property that Schurz calls “unlimited” open-
mindedness. As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, this further result
has interesting connections with our talk, introduced in subsection 3.2, of
infinitesimal degrees of belief. In fact, one can conjecture that the incompat-
ibilty between the Lockean thesis and unlimited open-mindedness no longer
holds if one allows for non-Archimedean degrees of belief: in such case, even
unlimited open mindedness (for arbitrary m) could be consistent with a ver-
sion of the Lockean thesis. We leave for another occasion the exploration of
such interesting conjecture.
4.2 Comparison with Makinson’s logic of uncertain in-
ference
As noted by two anonymous reviewers, the results of the present paper can
be connected to some more or less classical results in so called probability
logic (Adams, 1966, 2013), as shown in particular by Makinson (2012). It is
thus useful to briefly illustrate some of these connections.
The basic idea behind probability logic is that the premises of a deductive
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argument can be more or less uncertain; however, deductive logic by itself
has to do with truth-preservation, and does not tell much about how the
uncertainty of the conclusion depends on that of the premises. This motivates
the study of how the probability of an argument’s premises is preserved
under inference and transmitted to the conclusion. In practice, one aims at
calculating lower and/or upper bounds for the probability of the conclusion,
given the probabilities of the premises.
To this purpose, results like Theorem 3.1 on Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds
are obviously relevant. In fact, this theorem appears, even if in a different
form, in some classical discussion of probability logic, as follows. Let us first
note that such discussion usually proceeds in terms of “improbability prop-
agation” (rather than “probability preservation”), where the improbability
of proposition a is defined as U(a) = 1 − P (a) where P is a probability
measure over a Boolean algebra A. Now, in the case of a conjunction of n
propositions, a results going back at least to Suppes (1966) is the following
“uncertainty rule”:
U(a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an) ≤ U(a1) + · · ·+ U(an),
which provides an upper bound for the improbability of a conjunction given
the improbabilities of the conjuncts. Interestingly, one can easily check that
the above formula immediately translates into Theorem 3.1 above (see also
the recent review by Makinson and Hawthorne (2015), who calculated these
same bounds in their discussion of admissible rules for probability logic).
As noted by Makinson (2012), such results in probability logic helps clar-
ifying some important logical aspects of the Preface and Lottery paradoxes.
In fact, both paradoxes may be taken as illustrating “the unreliability of the
rule of conjunction of conclusions” in the context of the logic of uncertain
inference. Such rule reads as follows: if some set of premises A entails a1, and
it also entails a2, then A entails a1 ∧ a2. If “entailment” here is interpreted
as classical deduction, the rule holds; however, it may fail for non-deductive
consequence relations, as those associated with uncertain reasoning and as
vividly shown by the two paradoxes (Makinson, 2012, 513-14). Interestingly,
in his discussion of how to deal with the failure of the rule of conjunction of
conclusions, Makinson (2012, sec. 5.2, p. 518) points, even if only to discard
it, to the solution explored in the present paper: fixing a high threshold for
the probability of an argument’s premises, in order to bring the probability
of the conclusion as close to one as desired. As Makinson notes, this route
was already explored by Adams (1966) and others; from our perspective,
this suggests an interesting way of applying the bounds computed in our
Proposition 3.2 to the logic of uncertain inference as studies in probability
logic.
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4.3 Comparison with Douven and Uffink’s analysis
In an interesting discussion of the Preface paradox, Douven and Uffink (2003)
also defend the compatibility between the principle of conjunctive closure and
the probabilistic nature of degrees of belief by giving appropriate bounds for
the relevant thresholds. A quick comparison with our results is then in order.
Douven and Uffink share many of our assumptions and work within a
similar framework. They accept the Lockean thesis and the correspond-
ing threshold r, with 0.5 < r < 1. Moreover, they also work with regular
probabilities (meaning, to recall, that values 0 and 1 are only assigned to
contradictions and tautologies, respectively). Given all this, their most rele-
vant result for our purposes is the following. First, Douven and Uffink note
that, under the regularity assumption, for any finite set of contingent propo-
sitions a1, . . . , an, the probability P (a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) of the conjunction can be
expressed as the product of the probabilities P (ai | a1∧ . . .∧ai−1), for each i
(we have already recalled this fact in Equation 4). Then, they prove (Douven
and Uffink, 2003, Proposition 4.1) that if, for every i ranging over 2, . . . , n,
P (ai | a1 ∧ . . . ∧ ai−1) is at least n
√
r, then the conjunction a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an has
probability greater than r and hence is believable.
Interestingly, the first impossibility result proved by Schurz, that we al-
ready discussed in Section 4.1, turns out to be a generalization of the above
result by Douven and Uffink (Schurz, 2019, see the discussion of Corollary
3). Moreover, this should be compared with our Proposition 3.2, that estab-
lishes s = n+r−1
n
as the probability threshold for each of n propositions which
guarantees that their conjunction is believable to degree at least r. In this
connection, some remarks are in order.
First, since our result allows one to compute the minimum probability
required for each of the propositions a1, . . . , an, it also provides the relevant
bounds for the conditional probabilities P (ai | a1∧. . .∧ai−1), for each 2 ≤ i ≤
n, appearing in the formula (4), and hence to determine the constraints which
allow to rationally believe the conjunction a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an. This is easily done
by direct computation, as the following examples shows. Suppose that r has
been fixed and consider only two propositions, such that P (a1) = P (a2) =
2+r−1
2
. Then, applying Proposition 3.2 (we directly refers to a probability
measure P extending a coherent belief), we have:
P (a2 | a1) =
P (a1 ∧ a2)
P (a1)
≥ r2+r−1
2
=
2r
2 + r − 1
Second, it is interesting to note that our approach provides exactly the
same bounds computed in Douven and Uffink (2003) under the assumption
that all the statements a1, . . . , an are mutually independent. Indeed, in this
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case, P (ai | a1 ∧ · · · ∧ ai−1) = P (ai) and P (a1 ∧ . . .∧ ak) = P (a1) · . . . ·P (ak).
More precisely, we can prove the following.
Proposition 4.1. Let {a1, . . . , an} be a set of mutually independent events, β
a coherent belief assignment onthem and r ∈ [0, 1] a real number. If β(ai) ≥
n
√
r, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} then β(a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) ≥ r.
Proof. The proof will be made modulo de Finetti’s theorem and hence con-
sidering any probability measure P which extends β and whose existence is
ensured by the hypothesis. The independence of the events ai’s, gives us that
P (a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) = P (a1) · . . . · P (an). (5)
Therefore, if for all i = 1, . . . , n, β(ai) = P (ai) ≥ n
√
r, in particular
P (aj) = min{P (a1), . . . , P (an)} ≥ n
√
r. By (5), we have that
β(a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) = P (a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) ≥ (P (aj))n ≥ ( n
√
r)n = r.
which proves our claim.
The above Proposition states that our analysis agrees with the one devel-
oped by Douven and Uffink, in the special case of independent propositions.
Third, a remarkable difference between the two approaches is worth not-
ing. In our account, in order to check whether a conjunction a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an
is acceptable under the Lockean thesis, it is sufficient to check whether the
probability of each claim ai exceeds the relevant threshold calculated accord-
ing to Proposition 3.2. In Douven and Uffink’s approach, on the contrary,
to obtain the same result one needs to check whether the probability of
each claim, conditional on every other, exceeds the relevant threshold. This
method thus artificially extends the relevant sets of events from the original
claims a1, . . . , an to a new set including all conditional events of the form
(ai | a1 ∧ . . . ∧ ai−1), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By avoiding this detour, our
approach appears both simpler and, in a sense, more practical.
5 Conclusion
The Preface paradox is often meant to show that the requirement of conjunc-
tive closure of beliefs is incompatible with an account based on probabilistic
degrees of belief. We proved that this is strictly speaking false, and that
one can keep together the spirit, if not the letter, of both probabilism and
conjunctive closure under the Lockean thesis, while also respecting Weak
Fallibilism. Moreover, we showed how to compute, for both Archimedean
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and non-Archimedean probabilities, the value of the thresholds to be met in
order to believe long conjunctions of propositions, thus making precise the
notion of “nearly certain” belief. The price for this way-out of the paradox
is Quasi-dogmatism — i.e., the fact that a rational agent should be nearly
certain of what he believes — and a weak form of contextualism of rational
belief. Admittedly, this price may appear as too high, since if one rejects
Dogmatism, one may well be skeptical about Quasi-dogmatism for essen-
tially the same reasons. In any case, the purpose of this paper has been to
explore the possibility of fallibilism in the face of the Preface paradox, and
not to defend Quasi-dogmatism as a viable epistemological position. Further
discussion is needed in order to assess whether, and to what extent, this is
indeed defensible from a philosophical point of view.
A Appendix: technical background and proofs
Let us denote by R the field of real numbers with carrier R. Every non-zero
element of R satisfies the Archimedean property:
(A) Let a, b ∈ R be non-zero and assume that a < b. Then, there exists a
natural number n such that a+ a+ . . .+ a (n-times) is strictly greater
than b.
In this section we will show how to construct an extension of R which lacks
exactly this property and we will use it to prove some results presented in
the previous sections.
Let us consider a countable infinite index set which, for simplicity, we
will fix in the set of natural numbers N. A proper filter over N is a subset F
of its powerset P(N) which contains N, does not contain ∅, is closed under
intersection and upward closed, meaning that if X ⊆ Y are subsets of N
and X ∈ F , then Y ∈ F as well. A proper filter U over N is said to be
an ultrafilter, if U is maximal among proper filters with respect to the usual
relation of set inclusion.
A subset X of N is said to be cofinite if its complement, in N, is finite. The
set cofin(N) of all cofinite subsets of N is a proper filter of the boolean algebra
P(N) of all subsets of N which goes under the name of Fréchet filter. By
Zorn’s lemma, that there exists a (non-principal) ultrafilter U over N which
extends cofin(N) (Chang and Keisler, 2012, page 141). We will henceforth
adopt this notation and, when writing U , we will understand that U is an
ultrafilter which contains all cofinite subsets of N.
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Let RN denote the set of functions a : N → R, so that each a ∈ RN can
be displayed as a sequence, indexed by N, of elements from R:
a = 〈a1, a2, . . .〉 with ai ∈ R for all i ∈ N.
For each pair of elements a,b ∈ RN, let us define
a ∼=U b iff {i ∈ N | ai = bi} ∈ U .
The relation ∼=U actually is an equivalence on RN. Thus, let us denote by
∗R = (RN)/∼=U .
Every element [a]∼=U of
∗R precisely is the equivalence class of all those func-
tions b : N → R which are equivalent to a modulo ∼=U . With an abuse of
notation, we will identify each equivalence class of ∗R by its representative
element.
Recall that U contains all cofinite subsets of N. Therefore, if a and b
(regarded as sequences) only differ by a finite number of indexes, a ∼=U b.
The usual operations of sum and product, as well as the order relation
≤, naturally extend from R to ∗R in the following way: for all a,b ∈ ∗R,
• a + b = c iff {i ∈ N | ai + bi = ci} ∈ U ,
• a · b = c iff {i ∈ N | ai · bi = ci} ∈ U ,
• a ≤ b iff {i ∈ N | ai ≤ bi} ∈ U .
Thus, ∗R = (∗R,+, ·,≤,0,1) turns out to be a field, which however fails
in satisfying the property (A) above. To see this, let us first consider the
following.
Definition A.1. An element ε ∈ ∗R is said to be an infinitesimal, if ε > 0
and, for any other real number r, it holds ε < r, where r is identified with
the r-constant function r : N→ R, such that r(i) = r.
Example A.2. The typical example of an infinitesimal is the function ε : N→
R defined as ε(i) = 1
i+1
. It can be easily checked that ε > 0. Indeed, for each
i ∈ N, 1/(i+ 1) > 0, whence {i ∈ N | 1/(i+ 1) > 0} = N ∈ U . Moreover, for
every r ∈ R, there exists i0 ∈ N such that there are finitely many i < i0 such
that 1/(i + 1) > r and infinitely many j > i0 such that 1/(j + 1) < r. This
shows that {i ∈ N | 1/(i+ 1) < r} is cofinite and, thus, belongs to U .
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In what follows we denote by ∗[0, 1] the unital interval of ∗R and we shall
always assume, as above, that each infinitesimal is strictly positive.
We now consider ∗[0, 1]-valued probability measures, that is maps P from
a boolean algebra A to the interval ∗[0, 1] which are normalized (i.e., P (1) =
1) and additive (i.e., P (a∨b) = P (a)+P (b) for all a, b ∈ A such that a∧b = 0).
We shall call these maps “probabilities” without danger of confusion.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let us prove the claim by induction on n. The
basic case is for n = 2 and hence let b1, b2 such that P (b1), P (b2) > 1 − ε.
Thus, P (b1 ∨ b2) = P (b1) + P (b2)− P (b1 ∧ b2) and since P (b1 ∨ b2) ≤ 1, one
has
P (b1) + P (b2)− P (b1 ∧ b2) ≤ 1
that is,
P (b1 ∧ b2) ≥ P (b1) + P (b2)− 1 > (1− ε) + (1− ε)− 1 = 1− 2ε.
Now, assume the claim true for n = i and consider P (b1), . . . , P (bi), P (bi+1) >
1− ε. Therefore, denoting by a = b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bi and by the associativity of ∧,
one has
P (b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bi ∧ bi+1) = P (a ∧ bi+1)
where P (bi+1) > 1 − ε and, by the inductive hypothesis, P (a) > 1 − iε.
Therefore, P (a ∨ bi+1) = P (a) + P (bi+1)− P (a ∧ bi+1) ≤ 1 and hence
P (a ∧ bi+1) ≥ P (a) + P (bi+1)− 1 > (1− iε) + (1− ε)− 1 = 1− (i+ 1)ε.
Thus, the claim is settled.
Proof of Proposition 3.4 Thanks to Proposition 3.3 and the following
observation
Remark A.3. For each natural number n and for each hyperreal number
r < 1 there exists an infinitesimal ε such that
1. nε is infinitesimal;
2. nε2 < ε;
3. 1− ε > r.
Proof. (1) and (2) are true for every infinitesimal ε and every natural number
n. As to prove (3), assume that r = 1 − δ for some infinitesimal δ. Thus,
taking ε = δ2 and s = 1−ε, from (2) one has s = 1−ε = 1−δ2 > 1−δ = r.
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Proof of Equation (3) We have to show that, for all i ∈ N, β(a1) . . .
β(ai) =
(2i−1)r+1
2i
. Let us prove the claim by induction on i. The case i = 1 is
trivial, hence assume that the claim holds for i. Thus, by direct computation,
one has
β(a1) . . . β(ai) β(ai+1) = (2
i−1)r+1
2i
 r+2i+1−1
2
= (2
i−1)r+1
2i
+ r+2
i+1−1
2
− 1
= 2(2
i−1)r+2+r+2i+1−1−2i+1
2i+1
= 2
i+1r−r+1
2i+1
= (2
i+1−1)r+1
2i+1
.
This settles the claim.
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